Sailed4seas的部落格

MAERSK KENDAL該有甚麼SA呢?

0703時，MAERSK KENDAL位置如上圖所示，原航向藍色是是很明顯的錯誤，因為穿過了PRECAUTIONARY AREA。此時只有看到四條船要出港，假設不知道這4條船的動向如何? 從圖面上看，第一條ACE-dragon已經進入航道中間，所以可以假設他要繼續穿越，他的轉向點應該是在航道的內檔，也就是接近圖中所畫的的紫紅色區域，這些就是我們要盡量避開的地方 PRECAUTIONARY AREA，所以我們就把航線，直接改到橘色的方向，大概258度。這樣等本船開到的時候，整條航線都是位於precautionary AREA外側，也是就是航道的外檔。

至於第二條船的碰撞危機，可以改了航向以後再觀測，如果第二條船確定要橫越，他在本輪到達橘色區域時，航向不變，因為橘色區域是西航船的航道，他不可逆向航行，我們的工作是比較大家的金箍棒，誰先到碰撞點，先到後到都沒關係，只要不是同時到。(為甚麼要自己判斷，誰先到後到?不能看電子海圖或AIS，因為你已經是我的門徒了?至於，如何判斷? 如何把金箍棒放大縮小，還記得嗎?)。

如果是第二條船與本輪同時到，也不要慌，因為他不會亂轉，前面說過。再看下圖，0708時，該輪已經走到航道的外檔，但是船長不敢往南走250，橘色的航向，因為前面第二條船KOTA DRAGON還沒過船頭，如果要買保險，也應該對著第二條船KOTA DRAGON的船尾開，等他過了以後，再走250度。但是船長慌了，可能是聽到第三條船碰撞警告的聲音，或是看到第三條船船的航行燈，便直接對著燈塔走274度航向，心裡想著第三條過了以後，在走回原航道。如果你也是這樣想，你就犯了同樣的錯誤，下一個擱淺的就是你。因為你忘了檢查，碰撞點在航道的何處?

碰撞點在航道的何處?

是在航道的外側，所以我們絕對不可能，把船開到航道的外側去避碰。如果黑色的圓圈，真的是碰撞點的話，那也是表示第三條船在碰撞時間的船位，就在哪裡。(碰撞點的定義，就是兩條船同時到達，同一個地點)，第三條船絕對不會飛起來，衝到航道中間，所以只要本輪順著航道中間開航，走250度，就不會有碰撞危機。這就是金箍棒第一定律，棒子指到哪裡? 碰撞點就在哪裡。天理昭昭，絲毫不爽。

MAIB’s report on the grounding of the containershipMaersk Kendal on the Monggok Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on 16 September 2009 presents some all-too familiar problems and a package of lessons to learn. Complacency, lack of voyage planning, failure of bridge teamwork and inadequate awareness of the information being provided by the Singapore Vessel Traffic information service, were contributory factors.

Two items in the report in particular caught MAC’s attention. The first is the role of cultural factors in the bridge team which were also covered in the report on the grounding of chemical tanker Maria M. In that case a abrasive and abusive Italian master resulted in a bridge team that was afraid to challenge, question or advise him. OnMaersk Kendall the situation between the British master and an Indian chief officer was very different, they appeared to be on good terms and the master’s standing orders required the bridge team to question the master if in any doubt concerning his actions yet it still didn’t happen.

Says the MAIB report: “Although the master was approachable, he liked to get involved and to do things himself. This type of leadership carries the risk of working in isolation and, when not properly supported by the bridge team, can result in an error going undetected and unchallenged. Although the master, through his standing orders, had made it clear that the OOW should question the master’s actions when in doubt, this did not infer that the master would first discuss his intentions with the OOW. The master had not convened a bridge discipline meeting since joining the vessel on 17 August 2009 to clarify and reiterate his requirements, and it is evident that the chief officer considered it unnecessary to question the master’s intentions or actions on this occasion.