Sailed4seas的部落格

By Captain John Konrad (gCaptain)

 Every ship, regardless of nationality or purpose, is required to carry one terse book . This book is titled the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions but is better know by its acronym “COLREGs”. The chapters are short and to the point and ship officers are required to make marks of 90% on COLREGs tests taken to keep up their licenses. In order to pass this stringent requirement sailors have developed mnemonic aids to help them remember the contents. When the crew loses control of steering, the COLREGs demands that the ship display two red lights in a vertical line. The mnemonic for this rule is “Red over Red, the Captain’s dead”. Sailboats are required to display a red and green light and its said “Red over Green, sailing machine”. There are many more like this but one important rule for avoiding collisions with Navy warships is missing: “If it’s grey stay away.”1

While the media, with a very little hard data, attempts to understand the erratic maneuvers of the containership ACX Crystal on the night of her collision with the Destroyer USS Fitzgerald… professional mariners are certain that a long investigation will find the US Navy ship at fault.

Is this conclusion the result of professional arrogance? Or maybe because of resentment and jealousy over the fact that Navy captains are praised and decorated by the public and media while merchant ship captains live mostly unnoticed. Or is it because they are correct?

As a ship captain along with years working with the U.S. Navy both aboard ships and ashore – here are the reasons why I believe they are correct. The USS Fitzerald was at fault.

Communication Failure

Despite recent advancements in electronic collision avoidance tools like automatic identification systems (AIS), the three most important tools for avoiding a collision are a Captain’s eyes, tongue and ears.

Eyes, looking out the windows of his ship, are important because they can process information – like erratic course changes – faster and more accurately than electronic RADAR and charting systems that take time to aggregate data.

A tongue because the quickest and most effective way to predict how a ship is going to maneuver in the minutes before a collision is to call the Captain of the other ship on the VHF radio and ask.

Ears are important because language barriers and cultural differences are prominent at sea and you must listen intently to the other ship’s reply if you want any chance of understanding her intentions.

It is likely that USS Fitzgerald’s Captain used only one, or possibly none, of these tools when communicating with the ACX Crystal.

In the moments leading up to a collision a merchant ship captain has to do everything but steer the ship himself. With the assistance of one officer he has to watch the RADAR and AIS, plot the relative courses of nearby vessels, communicate with the Engine Room, talk with other ships on the VHF radio and issue orders. But on a navy ship each of these jobs is performed by a small team of sailors who report changes to, and obey orders from, the officer of the watch (OOW). The OOW relays the important information to the Captain.

This system of many team members – each working on equipment they have been very well-trained to operate and reporting through a command structure that filters all but the most important information to the captain – is highly effective in war when a warship is exchanging salvos of high speed torpedoes and missiles with numerous hostile targets (anyone doubting this should read Jeff Edward’s excellent book “Torpedo”). But this structure is ineffective when dealing with a single slow moving merchant ship.

An eye on the target and direct communication – Captain to Captain – is the most effective means of avoiding collision but this never happens on Navy ships. When a merchant ship attempts to call a U.S. Navy warship he first has to establish contact. Calling another merchant ship is relatively easy, you find the name of the ship on your AIS and hail it on the VHF. But the US Navy often turns off its AIS transmitter to prevent enemy’s from tracking warships via internet sites like MarineTraffic.com which pick up the AIS signal via commercial satellites and publish the positions online.

The alternative way to contact a Navy ship is by calling out its hull number (painted in huge white numbers on the bow) but, for various reasons, the Navy doesn’t always respond to this number.

Provided you do establish contact with the oncoming destroyer you run into another major obstacle. The person who responds to your call is not the Captain but a junior officer who relays the message to the Officer Of The Deck who relays it to the Captain. The Captain’s response then has to go back down the chain where time and information is lost, mistakes are made and the delays occur. Hard data is, more often than not, conveyed accurately, but more nuanced information – like the sound or anger, hesitation or exhaustion in the captain’s voice – is lost.

The communication problems don’t stop there. Navy ships require that information from complex systems move quickly between officers and they carry this out with a large vocabulary of acronyms, abbreviations and units of measurement that are highly effective for communication between American naval officers but are gibberish to foreign ship captains.

For example… a foreign ship captain will order his helmsman to turn port or starboard but an American captain orders left and right turns. Merchant Captains prefer true bearings based off the compass but Navy Captains prefer relative bearings based off the centerline of his own ship. And most frustrating of all, merchant mariners use Nautical Miles to denote distance but the Navy measures everything in yards.

Small differences? Maybe but a series of small discrepancies can lead to big problems.

Was VHF contact established between the two vessels before the collision? Why was the USS Fitzgerald Captain in his stateroom and not on the bridge looking out the window? Was he tuned into the VHF radio monitoring the conversation? Was the containership captain fluent in English and, if not, did the navy radioman listen with patience and speak with simple clarity? Did they communicate externally with international accepted standards or use U.S. Navy centric jargon?

This is important because basic communication problems have been found to be a primary cause in nearly every multi-vessel incident gCaptain has reported on in the last ten years.

作者: 約翰·康拉德船長（gCaptain）

每艘船舶，無論其國籍或目的，都需要攜帶一本簡潔的書。這本書的標題是“國際避碰規則”，但是它的字母縮詞“COLREG”更為人所知。這些章節很短，對於要求保持執照有效的COLREGs測試，船長需要90分才能過關。為了通過這個嚴格的要求，船員們開發了助記口訣，幫助他們記住內容。當船失去操舵控制時，COLREG要求船舶在垂直線上，顯示兩個紅燈。這個規則的助記口訣是“紅上加紅，船長死了”。如果是帆船，需要顯示紅色和綠色的燈光，並且表示“綠上紅，帆船”。還有更多這樣的口訣，但是避免與海軍軍艦的碰撞，最重要一個口訣，卻沒有加上去，那就是：“如果它灰溜溜，閃遠點”。1

雖然媒體只有一些很少的證據，去試圖了解驅逐艦USS Fitzgerald碰撞的夜晚，集裝箱船ACX水晶的不規則航路很可疑...專業水手確信，長時間的調查後，將發現美國海軍船舶是有過失的。

這個結論是傲慢專業的結果嗎？或者，也許是因為怨恨和嫉妒海軍船長，長期被公眾和媒體讚譽和妝點? 而商船船長，大多不被注意的事實。還是因為這個結論是正確的？

我作為多年來一直與美國海軍在船上和岸上，共同工作的船長，這就是為什麼，我相信這是正確的。美國海軍船舶是有過失的。

通訊失敗

儘管電子碰撞避免工具如自動識別系統（AIS）的最新進展，避免碰撞的三個最重要的工具是船長的眼睛，舌頭和耳朵。

眼睛，由本船的窗戶往外看，是重要的，因為船長可以比雷達和電子海圖系統，更快與更準確地處理信息，例如不規律的路線變化，電子系統是需要時間來匯總數據。

舌頭是因為最快捷最有效的方式，來預測在碰撞前的幾分鐘內，他船將如何操縱，就是在VHF甚高頻無線電台上，呼叫另一艘船長來詢問。

耳朵是重要的，因為語言障礙和文化差異，在海上是很嚴重的，如果你想有機會理解他船的意圖，你必須專心聽對方的答复。

在與ACX Crystal進行通信時，Fitzgerald的船長很可能，只使用了這些工具中的一個，也可能沒有。

在導致碰撞的時刻，商船船長必須做所有事情，除了操舵以外。在一名船副的幫助下，他必須觀看雷達和AIS，繪製附近船隻的相對航向，與機艙通訊，與VHF甚高頻無線上的其他船舶通話，並發出操船命令。但是在海軍艦艇上，這些工作都是由一小隊水手執行的，他們向當值船副OOW報告的任何變化，並遵守命令。 OOW當值船副，再將重要信息傳遞給船長。

這種有許多成員的團隊系統 - 每個人都在，已經訓練有素的設備上工作，他們通過指揮架構進行操作和報告，只將所有最重要的信息過濾給船長 - 在海戰中，當戰艦正在交互砲擊，高速魚雷和導彈，有許多敵對的標的。但是，在處理單一緩慢移動的商船時，這種指揮架構是無效的。

看著目標和直接溝通 - 船長對船長 - 是避免碰撞的最有效手段，但這絕對不可能在海軍的船上發生。當商船試圖打電話給美國海軍軍艦時，他首先必須建立聯繫。打電話給另一艘商船比較容易，您可以在AIS上找到船舶的名稱，並在VHF上呼叫。但美國海軍經常須關閉其AIS發射器，以防止敵人通過諸如MarineTraffic.com這樣的網站跟踪軍艦，MarineTraffic.com通過商用衛星接收AIS信號並在線上發布。

聯繫海軍船隻的另一種方法是，通過呼出船體號碼（以船頭上的巨大白色數字表示），但是由於各種原因，海軍並不會，總是對這一組數字作出回應。

就算你與迎面而來的驅逐艦，建立了聯繫，你將遇到了另一個主要障礙。回應你的電話的人，不是船長，而是一名初級軍官，他將信息轉發給船上的長官，再將其轉交給船長。船長的回應，然後必須回到原來的指揮鏈上，直到時間和信息都流失後，造成錯誤，或發生延誤。生硬的資訊，往往總能準確傳達，但更為細緻的信息 - 如船長聲音的聲調或憤怒，猶豫或疲憊 - 都失去了。

溝通問題並不止於此。海軍艦艇要求複雜系統的信息，在軍官之間，可以迅速移動，並以大量詞彙，縮寫和測量單位。這對美國海軍軍官之間的溝通非常有效，但對外國船長來說，是無聊的。

例如...外國船長將命令他的舵手，轉向turn port or starboard side，但美國船長命令左右轉向是left and right turns。商船長更喜歡，基於羅盤上真方位，但是海軍船長喜歡，相對於本船船艏向的方位。最令人沮喪的是，商船們使用“海浬”表示距離，但海軍則以碼數衡量一切。

小差異？可能吧。 只是一系列小的差異，會導致大的問題。

在碰撞之前，兩艘船之間是否有VHF聯絡？為什麼USS Fitzgerald船長在他的住艙裡，而不是在駕駛台上往窗外瞭望？他是否關切監控VHF對話？集裝箱船長的英文是否流利，如果不是，海軍無線電士是否用耐心聽，並能簡單的講呢？他們是否以國際公認對外的標準用語，還是以美國海軍為中心的行話通信呢？

這是很重要的，因為基礎通信的問題，已經被發現是gCaptain在過去十年中，幾乎每個多船事件報導的主要原因。

The Lack Of Specialists

In the not so distant past, merchant ship captains holding a “Master Unlimited” license, the highest license issued by the Coast Guard, were  legally sanctioned to command any ship of any size upon oceans. The only limitation placed on that license was large sailing ships (Tall Ships). While that is still technically true today, a containership company would not hire a tanker captain and a cruise ship company would not give a large cruise ship to a containership captain. They want people  having experience aboard similar types of ships.

It takes a bachelor’s degree from a Maritime Academy  plus approximately 10 years and the completion of weeks worth of intense testing to earn a Master Unlimited license. There are ways around some of these requirements (like having a college degree) depending on the flag state, but all maritime nations have strict rules governing how many days of those 10 years were spent at sea. A civilian ship captain will spend at least a few hours on the bridge of the ship every day of work. That translates to a lot of experience avoiding collision.

The U.S. Navy also has specialized strict standards for enlisted sailors. If you want to operate a RADAR, for example, you must pass general examinations, be selected, attend the Navy’s challenging “A” school and commit to a five year service obligation. Then enlisted sailors have to prove their ability aboard ship under the watchful eye of non-commissioned officers.

Each individual piece of critical equipment aboard a navy ship has a highly trained and competent person(s) assigned to it. The total number of people working, on both the bridge and the Combat Information Center (CIC) to navigate the ship exceeds a dozen.

The merchant ship captain, who has to operate all equipment himself, often has to use his experience and expertise to fill in gaps of information. But the Naval officer has the opposite problem. He is often working with too much information as it comes in from all the enlisted people who work for him… and he has to use his knowledge and experience to filter out unnecessary data. The question is, how much experience does he have?

The captain of a merchant ship does not work in an office, he never gets sent to the engine room to stand a watch, and with just two dozen people aboard his ship at any one time he is free of most of the administrative and disciplinary duties that come with commanding a Navy destroyer with five times the number of sailors.

But unlike the merchant captain and the enlisted specialists working on navy ships, the U.S. Navy Captain and his bridge officer (OOD) are generalists. A large percentage of their careers are spent working shoreside jobs and  their shipboard time was spent rotating through positions: the engine room, the combat information room, in administrative positions and elsewhere.

In short, the merchant ship captain and bridge officers have significantly higher number of hours spent on the bridge then their naval counterparts.

Why Was The Navy Captain In His Cabin

One myth that persists among the general public is that Captain Joseph Hazelwood, master of the Exxon Valdez, was drunk at the wheel of his ship when she grounded on Bligh Reef. The truth is far different.

Captain Hazelwood rightfully shouldered the blame for that incident because a Captain is responsible for the actions of his crew but his level of intoxication, if any (blood alcohol tests were inconclusive) was found not to be a primary cause of the incident. How could it be? He was not on the bridge of the ship when it grounded. He was in his cabin! The ship was grounded not by Hazelwood but by a junior officer he trusted to navigate the ship safely.

Ship Captains never take the wheel and drive the ship, helmsmen and autopilots do that job. Ship captains spend most of their time in the office doing paperwork or managing people all around the ship. The actual navigation of the vessel is done on the bridge by a junior officer called the Officer In Charge Of The Navigational Watch (OICNW). The US Navy operates the same way but that officer is the Officer Of The Deck (OOD).

It is this officer’s duty to navigate the ship safely according to the voyage plan laid out by the captain. This officer is in charge of communicating with and avoiding other ships. He is the one responsible for avoiding collisions and he holds this responsibility with important caveat; it is his duty to call the captain whenever there is possible risk of collision or danger of any kind.

And it is the Captain’s duty to go to the bridge whenever he is called for help.

缺乏專業

在不太遙遠的過去，擁有“無限噸位”執照的商船船長，是海岸警衛隊頒發的最高許可證，依法規管制，可以在海上任何船隻工作。該許可證的唯一限制，是大型帆船（高船）。雖然今天仍然是真實的，但在技術上，集裝箱公司不會僱用油輪船長，遊輪公司也不會讓集裝箱船長做大型遊輪。他們希望有經驗的人，都是做相似類型船舶。

無限噸位商船船長，需要海事學院的學士學位，加上大約10年的海勤時間，並完成了數週的激烈測試，以獲得無限制許可證。這些要求（如擁有大學學位），有一些取決於船旗國的規定，但所有海事國家都有嚴格的規則，管理這10年在海上的天數。一艘商船船長，每天至少要花上幾個小時在船上工作。這意味著避免碰撞的經驗很多。

美國海軍，也對兵員有嚴格的標準。例如，如果你想操作雷達，你必須通過普通考試，被選中，參加海軍挑戰性的“A”學校，承諾提供五年的服務義務。然後登船的船員，必須在非委任的官員的監視下，證明其船上的工作能力。

海軍船上的每一件關鍵裝備，都有一名受過高度訓練合格的人員在操作。在駕駛台和戰情中心（CIC）上工作的人員，總數超過十幾人。

自己操作所有設備的商船船長，常常要用自己的經驗和專業，填補信息的空白。但海軍軍官，卻有相反的問題。所有為他經常工作的人員，提供了太多的信息，他必須利用他的知識和經驗，來過濾掉不必要的數據。問題是，他能有多少經驗？

一艘商船的船長，不必在辦公室工作，他從來沒有被送到機房當過一班，在他的船上，只有二十幾人要管理，他沒有太多的行政和紀律責任。指揮一條海軍驅逐艦，水兵人數是他的五倍。

但不像商船，和在軍艦上工作的士官，[美國海軍軍官和他的駕駛台官員（OOD）都是通才。他們職業生涯的很大一部分，是在岸上工作，他們在船的時間，經常轉移職位：機艙，戰情中心，行政職位和其他地方。

簡而言之，商船船長和船副，比起海軍艦艇上的相同職務，當班花的時間，要多得多。

為什麼海軍船長在他的住艙

持續存在於公眾中的一個神話是，埃克森堡瓦爾德茲輪Exxon Valdez的船長約瑟夫·赫澤爾伍德（Captain Joseph Hazelwood），在Bligh Reef擱淺時，在船的上駕駛台喝醉了。真相是截然不同的。

Hazelwood船長正確地承擔了，這一事件的責任，是因為船長本就該負責船員的行為，但他的酒精度濃度（如果有的話，（血液酒精測試不確定））不是被認為事件的主因。怎麼會這樣？當船擱淺時，他不在駕駛台上。他在他的住艙裡，該船不是由Hazelwood去擱淺的，而是由一名資淺船副，他信任能安全航行的船副。

船長從來沒有拿過舵輪，操縱船隻，舵手和自動舵機，在做這項工作。船長花費大部分時間，在辦公室做文書工作，或管理船上的人員。該船的實際導航是由一名名為“航行班負責船副”（OICNW）的初級船副在駕駛台上完成的。美國海軍的運作方式相同，但該軍官叫是”甲板官員”（OOD）。

根據船長制定的航程計劃，該員有義務安全駕駛船舶。該員負責與其他船舶進行溝通和避碰。他是負責避免碰撞的人，他承擔了重要的責任;每當有可能發生碰撞，或任何危險時，他有責任打電話給船長。

當被要求幫助時，船長有義務去駕駛台。

But the captain of the USS Fitzgerald, like Captain Hazelwood, was not on the bridge. He remained in his cabin where he was  injured during the collision. Did the OOD fail to call him up to the bridge for help managing the situation? Did he ignore the OOD’s call for help? Or, like the Exxon Valdez, did the bridge team not realize they were in trouble until it was too late?

Either way, a major error was made by someone aboard the USS Fitzgerald.

Available Resources

USS Fitzgerald

Let’s take a quick look at just some of the resources the USS Fitzgerald’s captain had at his disposal prior to the collision.

The USS Fitzgerald is an Arleigh Burke class destroyer with a top speed well in excess of 30 knots. Speed is helpful in preventing collision because it allows you to put more distance between you and a dangerous ship in the same amount of time. (Yes, speed can also be dangerous.)

She is powered by four gas turbine engines with over 100,000 horsepower available to turn her propellers. Gas turbines are expensive and burn lots of fuel but the Navy uses them because they can provide an immense amount of torque in a very short period of time. Torque translates to acceleration and acceleration is important if you need to get out of the way of something fast.

The Arleigh Burke class destroyer has highly advanced AN/SPY-1 three dimensional RADAR, variable pulse width surface RADAR, AIS transceivers and a hull mounted sonar array tied into an Electronic Warfare Suite capable of tracking objects of small size moving at a high speed in real time.

The USS Fitzgerald is highly maneuverable with a very tight turning radius. While the exact figures are not public information this video of an Arleigh Burke Destroyer turning 180 degrees is very impressive.

Containership ACX Crystal

The Containership ACX Crystal however… has a theoretical top speed of 25 knots but is rarely pushed that fast.

She has a single 8-cylinder diesel engine capable of pushing one propeller with 29,200 horses for 3/10ths the amount of power of the destroyer. The acceleration of a ship like this is measured in miles, not minutes like the destroyer. Diesel engines like hers are the size of a modest house  and are locked into a certain speed at night. The bridge officer can cut speed immediately but at the risk of damaging equipment. Changing speed safely requires that the engineers wake up, change into work clothes and walk down to the engine room to check the equipment before moving the throttle.

She has two RADAR sets of modern design that is likely able to overlay digital charts. Said RADAR system requires a minimum of 3 minutes of pinging to properly calculate another ship’s change in course and/or speed.

She also has an AIS receiver that plots the position, course, speed, rate of turn and other useful information on the RADAR display in (close to) real time. In turn, her AIS system transmits her information to other ships including warships. She must, by law, transmit this information at all times. Her AIS unit does not, however, receive any data from Navy ships who cloak their positions.

She weighs four times as much as the destroyer. She can also stop and turn on a dime… but only if that dime is owned by giants and has a diameter measured in nautical miles.

She has 8 officers, a captain and around a dozen unlicensed sailors… versus the destroyer’s 33 officers, 38 chief petty officers and 210 enlisted sailors.

But I thought the Containership Was At Fault?

The media has been publishing reports on “crazy ivan turns” and erratic behavior all based on incomplete and one sided AIS data which can not yet be correlated with the exact time of collision. It is too early, and information too scant, to publish a list of her faults.

That said, she is at fault! Remember the COLREGS? What I failed to mention in the beginning of this article is that, while terse, the book is littered with terms like “safe speed”, “due diligence” and “lookout by all available means”. These words are nebulous and have remained so for centuries for a reason… so that no captain can ever shirk his responsibility for avoiding a collision. The COLREGS are terse, specific and targeted when it comes to assigning blame but soft and imprecise when it comes to removing responsibility and blame. Thus, every modern admiralty court trial of ships colliding has found fault with both ships, even if one is securely anchored!

Under COLREGS, whenever two ships touch each other, both Captains are to blame.

For this reason I am 99.9% confident that the Captain of the USS Fitzgerald will be found at fault… and so will the Captain of the ACX Crystal.

但是，菲茨杰拉德（USS Fitzgerald）的船長，就像哈澤爾伍德船長，不在駕駛台上。他留在他的住艙內，在碰撞時受傷。 OOD沒有把他叫到橋上，幫助管理這個情況？他是否忽視了OOD的呼叫？或者像埃克森·巴爾德斯一樣，駕駛台團隊並沒有意識到，他們遇到麻煩，直到太晚了？

無論哪種方式，USS Fitzgerald上，都有人犯了重大錯誤。

可用資源

USS Fitzgerald

我們來看看美國的菲茨杰拉德船長在碰撞之前，所掌握的一些資源。

USS Fitzgerald是一個Arleigh Burke級驅逐艦，最高速度超過30海浬。速度有助於防止碰撞，因為它允許您在相同的時間內，在您和危險的船舶之間，留下更多的距離。 （是的，速度也能是危險的。）

她由四台燃氣渦輪發動機提供動力，超過十萬馬力，可用於轉動螺旋槳。燃氣輪機價格昂貴，燃燒大量燃料，但海軍使用它們，因為它們可以在很短的時間內，提供巨大的轉矩。轉矩可以轉換為加速度，加速度是重要的，如果你需要快速擺脫的方法。

Arleigh Burke級驅逐艦具有高度先進的AN / SPY-1三維雷達，可變脈寬地表雷達，AIS收發器，和在電子戰套件中的，船體固定聲納陣列，能夠即時跟踪，高速移動的小尺寸物體。

USS Fitzgerald具有很高的機動性，迴轉半徑很窄。雖然確切的數字，是不公開信息，但是Arleigh Burke Destroyer的視頻顯示 video of an Arleigh Burke Destroyer turning 180 degrees ， 180度迴轉是令人印象非常深刻。

集裝箱船ACX水晶號

然而，集裝箱ACX水晶號最高速度，理論上為25節，但很少全速前進。

她擁有一台8缸柴油發動機，能夠用單一推進器產生29200匹馬力，是驅逐艦馬力的3/10。像這樣的船，加車是以海浬計，而不是像驅逐艦，是以幾分鐘計算。像她這樣船的柴油發動機，是一個普通房子的大小，在晚上，被鎖到一定的速度。駕駛台官員可以立即減速，但有設備損壞的風險。安全地改變速度，需要工程師在油門做動之前醒來，換成工作服，然後走到機艙去檢查設備。

她有兩套現代化設計雷達RADAR，可以重疊顯示在電子海圖上。這種雷達RADAR系統需，至少3分鐘的測繪，才能正確計算另一艘船的航線和/或速度變化。

她還有一個AIS接收器，可以在RADAR顯示器上，即時顯示位置，航向，速度，轉速等有用信息。反過來，她的AIS系統，將她的信息傳送到其他船隻，包括軍艦。依法她必須發送這一信息。然而，她的AIS系統，並沒有收到海軍船隻，傳送其職務上的任何資料。

她的重量是驅逐艦的四倍。她也可以停車，開始一分錢式的迴轉，但這一分錢只有巨人能用，直徑是以海浬為單位。

她有8名船副管輪，一名船長和十幾名無執照的水手，而驅逐艦有33名軍官，38士官長和210名專業海員。

但我認為集裝箱是否有故障？

媒體一直在發布關於“瘋狂的伊凡翻彎”和不穩定行為的報告，這些行為都是基於不完整和單面的AIS數據，這些數據與確切的碰撞時間無關。現在還為時過早，而且信息太少，不得不公佈她的錯誤清單。

那說，她是錯的！記得COLREGS嗎？在這篇文章的開頭我沒有提到的是，儘管這本書充斥著“安全的速度”，“盡職調查”和“以一切可用的手段”的術語。這些話是模糊的，因為一個原因已經存在了幾個世紀，所以沒有一個隊長可以推卸責任，避免碰撞。當涉及到消除責任和責備時，COLREGS是簡潔明了的，具體的和針對性的，當涉及到分配責任，但軟和不精確。因此，每次現代海軍法庭審判的船舶碰撞都發現了兩艘艦船的故障，即使是安全錨定！

在COLREGS下，每當兩艘船互相碰撞時，兩名船長都要責怪。

因此，我有99.9％的信心，美國海軍Fitzgerald的船長將被發現是錯誤的，ACX水晶船長也是如此。

About John Konrad

Captain John Konrad is the founder and CEO of gCaptain and author of the book Fire On The Horizon. John is a USCG licensed Master of Unlimited Tonnage, has sailed a variety of ships from ports around the world and is a distinguished alumni of SUNY Maritime College.

船長約翰·康拉德是gCaptain的創始人兼首席執行官，並且是“火之地平線”一書的作者。 約翰是USCG授權的無限噸位碩士，已經從世界各地的港口出發了各種船舶，並且是SUNY海事學院傑出的校友。