Sailed4seas的部落格

Chapter 8

Planning and Prioritizing– Good habits/Bad habits – Willingness to Comply

Voyage Planning Elements

Planning is an appraisal of all risks pertinent and relevant to the voyage to be undertaken. Life is a voyage and our career at sea is a voyage. How we plan our way through the high and low of our career is depend on our knowledge. The knowledge necessary for our plan are all there to be grasped by us. Whichever is necessary and which is unnecessary depend on our recognition of the ever changing world. The world we sensed depends on our mental ability of conscious especially for those inexperienced OOW who did not have long term memories to support their working habit. The best way to do is for senior OOW to prepare a voyage plan to include all risks foreseeable by his seniority and experience to best aid the inexperienced OOW to follow up in his first voyage. The voyage plan has the same properties as a standard operation procedure (SOP) in land base which should be in written form and properly assign each stage’s different parameters to be watched out. Working habits is our LT memories which just like sets of automatic programming for our routine works at sea. For those did not have working habits at sea voyage planning is like the Standard Operation Procedures in land base which were intended for OOW on duty to carry out his watch regardless his original knowledge and experience level. Those elements to be grasped had been defined by professional bodies like IMO as below. 

International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines For Voyage Planning, Resolution A.893(21) adopted on 25 November 1999.          

Voyage Planning Elements in each leg

A comprehensive voyage plan will include details marked on the appropriate charts (paper or electronic) as well as voyage planning forms provided by the vessel’s management company under their Safety Management Manual and consistent throughout the company’s fleet. The voyage plan should include the following details as a minimum:

Planned track with true course and distance of each leg, plotted out on appropriately-scaled charts (if an electronic charting system is used, the appropriate waypoints should be entered in the system and checked by another individual);

•Safe speed for each leg of the passage, taking into account navigational hazards, maneuvering characteristics, and draft in relation to water depth including squat and heel effect when turning, as applicable;

•Estimated times of arrival at critical points in the plan;

•Wheel over positions, as applicable;

•Turn radius for each alteration, as applicable;

•Areas to be avoided where the vessel is restricted either by local regulations (i.e., marine sanctuaries) or restricted due to water depth or local dangers;

•Areas covered by local regulations such as VTS, tug escort or assist services, and pilotage requirements;

•Areas with high traffic density and/or ferry crossings;

•Areas considered to be pilotage waters where the Master, an area license holder, or a Pilot should be on the bridge;

•Areas where it is considered that the engine room should be at an increased state of readiness;

•Navigational marks to use when navigating visually near a waypoint indicating an alteration of course;

•Method and frequency of position fixing, including primary and secondary alternatives; and

•Contingency plans for emergencies including abort points for port, channel, and/or berth approaches, and actions to take to place the vessel in deep water or proceed to a port of refuge or safe anchorage.

Voyage Planning Consideration of Information

In preparation for voyage planning, a wide array of information must be reviewed and considered. The following is a list of some items the officer in charge of voyage planning might consult:

•Appropriately-scaled charts, navigational publications such as notices to mariners, and nautical publications;

•Waterway characteristics, navigational obstructions, bar crossings and water depths;

•Institutional knowledge of areas to be transited from previous voyages (may be taken from previous voyage plans developed by fleet vessels);

•Characteristics, condition (including engineering conditions), and operational limitations of the vessel;

•Applicable local regulations, including Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), tug escort or assist services, and pilotage requirements, etc.;

•Predicted weather, current, tidal, wind, swell, and visibility conditions along the route;

•Vessel traffic patterns and areas of expected high traffic density;

•Internal and external communication procedures and requirements;

•Vessel operations which require additional sea room, such as ballast exchange or pilot embarkation;

•Anticipated watch conditions; and

•Company’s regulations such as ships routing schemes and reporting systems.

Voyage Planning and Bridge Rescource Management

Voyage planning is a key element of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) forming the foundation for bridge team to ensure the vessel’s safe transit along its intended route. A voyage plan (or passage plan) is a comprehensive, berth to berth guide, developed and used by a vessel’s bridge team to determine the most favorable route, to identify potential problems or hazards along the route, and to adopt bridge management practices to ensure the vessel’s safe passage. During passage planning, portions of a voyage that have the potential to pose the greatest risk should receive additional review, and the limits and conditions for undertaking those portions of the voyage set in advance.

A good voyage plan can stipulate all risks at sea to be watched out enroute. The simple truth is no plan can foresee all the future. Actual environment are always changeable even include some uncontrollable forces of nature (Force Majeure). We have to assign proper man power to counter the extra risks we may face. The Master should review and approve the plan and each bridge team member should review and sign the plan indicating they understand it. If a voyage is not proceeding as planned or cannot be accomplished safely under existing conditions, OOW should call for help honestly and quickly to ship’s management. Adjustments to the voyage plan must be made accordingly and communicated effectively.

Case study : German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty report :455/05 15

 “One vessel sailed from Port of Namibe outbound at 0748 p.m. Pilot left the vessel at 0803 p.m. after finish her turning from the berth (blue vessel). Her mean draft is 5.4 Meters. At 0808 p.m. Third Office entered the bridge, with 2.7 NM to go way point number 3 (blue cross on the chart) Master order the course alternation by “Port Five” rudder order. By the course change from 307⁰(T) to 240⁰(T), the turn is nice and easy at turning rate about 10 degrees per minutes. After turning at 0815 p.m., Master felt comfortable about the course alternation he had made. Master order to increase speed to “Half ahead” and told the helm to switch to auto pilot. At the same time Master ask the Third Office to erase the way point setting in GPS of number 3 and 4. During the turn, Third Officer then informed Master they should sailed at 210⁰(T) if next way point Master wished is way point Number 5 at Punta Alpina. Master told Third Office to steer at 240⁰ (T) and went on radio room to prepare some formalities at 0820 p.m.. At 0825 p.m. suddenly vibration were felt at bridge and heavy blows followed. The Master had rushed to bridge and stopped the engine as he became aware that vessel obvious already aground.” 

If vessel could follow her planned route on the chart above, aground won’t happen. In the IMO Guidelines For Voyage Planning, Resolution A.893(21) had stipulated four components of voyage/passage planning should be followed :

1. Appraisal: All information relevant to the contemplated voyage or passage should be considered.
2. Planning: On the basis of the fullest possible appraisal, a detailed voyage or passage plan should be prepared which should cover the entire voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas where the services of a pilot will be used.
3. Execution: Having finalized the voyage or passage plan, as soon as time of departure and estimated time of arrival can be determined with reasonable accuracy, the voyage or passage should be executed in accordance with the plan or any changes made thereto.
4. Monitoring : The plan should be available at all times on the bridge to allow officers of the navigational watch immediate access and reference to the details of the plan. The progress of the vessel in accordance with the voyage and passage plan should be closely and continuously monitored. Any changes made to the plan should be made consistent with these Guidelines and clearly marked and recorded.  

In this case, voyage planning is constructed after the incident with limited evident. Through the statements of the report, Master felt comfortable about his turning from 307⁰(T) to 240⁰(T). Before the turning, Master can recall the distance to way point number 3 is 2.7 Nautical Mile (original report page 11). If we use the parallel index methods to determine next course 232⁰(T) beam distance to nearest land on the chart will be about 3.0 nautical miles.

3 nautical miles is not just a random number in this case. It is the criteria and common sense for coastal vessel first officer/navigator planning work. In the appraisal period, it is quite common for some shallow water areas protruding along the coast. If shallow water areas had not extended to seaward too far, in the planning stage navigator will use 3 nautical miles beam distance to set the course line along the course. In the execution stage, all OOW should have the common sense to keep all land base radar echo to 3 nautical miles away along all the course legs. This is common practice to facilitate the course monitoring all the way from port to port. To monitor the progress of the sailing lag of course 307⁰(T), at 0808 p.m. vessel had just finish the turning from the berth direction 158⁰(T) to 307⁰(T). The beam distance of next course 232⁰(T) to the coastal radar echo is about 0.5 nautical miles if master had checked this distance in radar screen by rotating his heading mark to 232⁰(T). Master is comfortable before turning at 0808 p.m., after turning at 0815 p.m. and left bridge at 0820 p.m. 5 minutes later. Before and after the turning it is common practice to fix ship’s position. Master did not bother to fix his position and further ask his OOW to operate the GPS instead of the chart work of fixing ship’s position. Third mate did not notice anything wrong while Master left bridge at 0820 hours. Beside the radar echo, they felt nothing wrong while looking outside the windows in bridge. No visual hints had been picked up for further confirmation. Complacency is the only explanation.     

Common Sense in Voyage Planning

Common sense to a planner/navigator is not necessary the same to other OOW (especially junior OOW), even the Master. While I was a second mate in charge of the navigation plan, vessel is planning the route from Japan to Persian Gulf while Iran & Iraq fight period. Once vessel inside the Hormuz Strait, north side is fighting zone and south side is oil rig zone. With two side Army bombing suspected vessel, our calling rotation is Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait. Although we had war bonus, every man work with the price of their life. I joined the vessel in ship yard while she is dry docking and chartered to new charterer. There is no route on the chart for this new service. I asked the Master how many Nautical Miles I should keep away from each cape of island and each leg of coastal passage along the Japan coast. The Master replied 3 Nautical Miles. Instantly I understood he had no idea of what voyage planning is. 3 nautical miles is for coastal vessel and naval vessel, not for ocean going vessel. I decided by myself to keep 5 nautical mile from each turning point and leg of passage. All voyage plans proved to be success for apparently coastal vessels are sailed inside our route (3 nautical miles away from coastal) and ocean going vessels in general same sailing direction with own ship ( no unnecessary head on situation developed). By that time, ship routing is just promoted by IMO and Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) is not world widely accepted. Half year later, Japan Maritime authority announced their TSS in which ocean going vessel are requested to keep about 5 nautical miles away from Japan coast (this request comes with the form of new TSS set up along Japan coast in chart work drawing, not verbs).

The skill gap of this Master is because he is a retired naval commander. In navy system, not all commander promotion followed the strict route of merchant marine chain of command 3/Officer, 2 /Officer and Chief Officer. In merchant marine, we had the chance in charge of navigation planning at some stage depend on different company and fleet requirements. In navy, they have more variety promotion routes than merchant marine. This job function of navigation planning may not be necessary part of his experience. Naval retired OOW usually more reliable than school graduated OOW for their seniority and personal esteem are stronger. But we also have to look honestly for possible skill gap they may have and give them necessary training and rehearsal.

For a prudent OOW, some general principals are also self evident if he is in the right working track (habits). This common sense of keeping 5 nautical milts from the coast is deriving from the working habit to set up parallel index for each leg of voyage route along the coast. It is no news for an ocean going vessel aground due to give way to coastal vessel sailing near by coastal area. If OOW had the habit to set the parallel index in each leg, the beam distance to nearest ground is identified instantly by the professional eye on radar screen. Each time OOW measure the beam distance from the intended sailing route is 5 nautical miles. And every time the beam distance is 5 nautical miles for each leg, then this beam distance of 5 nautical miles become second nature of OOW. Common practice becomes common sense. Once we have the sense of the common practice we have the situational awareness in our subconscious. This common practice becomes part of our working habit. We use our good working habits to develop our sailing plan so as to maintain our good practices.           

Priority in Voyage Planning.

As the world is ever changing, the plan in each leg of voyage will face different situation. OOW have to adjust his priority to cope with the change. Namely these are the elements in voyage plan (followed IMO recommendations):

• Safe speed,
• ETA at critical points,
• Areas :
  • to be avoided;
  • covered by local regulations;
  • with high traffic density; 
  • considered to be pilotage waters:
  • where engine room should be at readiness,
• Navigational marks to use when navigating visually near a waypoint indicating an alteration of course,
• Method and frequency of position fixing, including primary and secondary alternatives; Wheel over positions,
• Turn radius for each alteration,
• Contingency plans for emergencies including abort points for port, channel, and/or berth approaches, and actions to take to place the vessel in deep water or proceed to a port of refuge or safe anchorage.

No procedures can exhaust all the possibilities in the route. The best a navigator/oow can do in his appraisal/planning stage is to follow best practice and simplifier the procedures to that point as his basic instinct can react without second thoughts of safety concern.

All collisions are enrooted in a simple mistake: Over Speed.

No wonder IMO recommendation put “Safe Speed” in its first consideration. The collision case in Chapter 6 vessel outbound Shang Hai TSS is over speed (15 knots while vessel around are using 10 knots only) which caused unnecessary overtaking situation. Another example below showed an even higher speed (26 knots) vessel with inattention consequence. German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty report: 450/07 15 September 2008.

One vessel sailed TSS Laotieshan Shuidao southbound at course 117⁰(T) ten minutes before the collision. Several smaller vehicles were plotted on the X-band radar on starboard side. Chief officer checked on the paper chart to see whether it is possible to evade to portside to avoid starboard side vehicles spotted to give more wide sea room to them respectively.      

Since the sea chart did not show any obstacles and shallowness in ship’s area, course altered to 090⁰(T) eight minutes before the collision (at 1927 hours). Neither crossing traffic nor green/red side light had been sighted yet. The course alternation took two minutes to steady at 090⁰(T) at 1931 hours, four minutes before the collision happened.

Northbound vessel was spotted after sight as recently as immediately prior to the collision by superstructure lighting. The collision happened 4 minutes after vessel steady on 090⁰(T). The visibility at the time is 9 nautical miles.   

The priority of the watch is to avoid the collision with fishing vehicles in the beginning at 1925 hours when departed TSS Laotieshan Shuidao. If vessel has to take avoidance action, the water depth along the course line has to watch out. So this priority had been taken care by the chief officer southbound vessel. At 1927 hours the avoidance action taken by chief officer has to carry out by chief officer himself for he is the only man on bridge. The priority of proper lookout is not obeyed during vessel turning from 1927 to 1930 hours. After course altered to 090⁰(T), no additional targets checking around the vessel had carried out. The northbound vessel now is only 2.6 nautical miles away readily visible by sight. This is the fatal mistake and last chance to avoid the collision. In another side of the northbound vessel, course altered from 311.7⁰(T) to 014.5⁰(T) (193154-193500 hours) within 3 minutes showed a turning rate of 20 degrees per minutes means this vessel had done what he can to avoid the collision.

The root cause of collision is poor lookout in South bound vessel where

• only one chief officer is on watch at bridge and
• C/O did not recognized ocean going vessel is within the fishing vessels and
• C/O did not check on radar screen for any effect on his course altering to 090⁰(T)
• C/O did not outside the windows for any vessel crossing his new course 090⁰(T)
• Northbound vessel sighted immediately prior to the collision by superstructure lighting.

What is the common sense of safety speed?

In common sense, safety speed is the speed won’t give you unnecessary trouble while sailing. If a prudent navigator can recall he probably will remember the coastal vessels around the Japan are commonly sailed in 12 Knots through water. This practice is derived from the speed limitation in Tokyo Wan Uraga Suedo. If the coastal vessel cannot fit this criteria( making up 12 knots through water) it may suffer a lot of situation of overtaking in these Japanese waterways (Speed Limit. Vessels shall not navigate at a speed of more than 12 knots through the water.). Over many years sailing at same route these coastal vessels developed the common sense of most favorable speed is same speed as other vessels. This theory needs no prove from other source just imaging we are walking in a crowded street. The walking speed is already not an option to us; we just follow where the traffic can accept “the same speed” by our subconscious while avoid the collision by our sole instinct. We can follow our subconscious on shore while walking but sailing on the water is not part of our nature instinct. Only the Navigator over the years can develop the common sense through his common practice. To safely sail in a waterway is to use the general speed applied by coastal vessels if the traffic pattern are not familiar to the navigator. If two ships sailed with same speed and same course, there is no relative motion to both vessels. The lookout efforts then can save to watch out for crossing vessels.  

The golden rule for lookout is looking out the window

A good voyage plan will take all elements affect successful execution into consideration. For an ocean going vessel lots factors critical in ancient time are almost eliminated by Maritime authorized bodies all around the world including legislation, pollution prevention, harbor security, joint inspection memorandums in all continents. All parties’ efforts are jointly to fight with sub-standard vessel. This practice had help seaman to fight with their ship owner to improve their working condition especially in safety and working hours. No man is perfect so we need a plan, voyage planning. No plan is perfect so we need a team. No team is perfect so what we need? We need automatic thoughts in each voyage planned. These automatic thoughts are our working habits to support our normal life through our subconscious. These working habits are changed with different navigational equipment available on board, with different technology and skill.

A five days course of RADAR/ARPA required by STCW 95 to ensure the competence Use of Radar and ARPA to Maintain Safety of Navigation of Table A-II/1 of the STCW Code and Maintain Through the Use of Radar and ARPA and Modern Navigation Systems to Assist Command Decision Making of Table A-II/2 of the STCW Code.

The mandatory carriage of ECDIS， as required by SOLAS regulation V/19.2.1 0, and 2010 Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention which have introduced ECDIS training for master and officers under chapter 11 or VII of the STCW Convention.

The working habits of situation awareness had shifted from visual lookout to machine lookout. From the feeling get outside the window changed to feeling get from the monitor screen. As machine is designed to overcome all weather and visibility conditions, although there are lots of limitations in interpretation of these monitored figures/ echo displayed, we tend to believe as long as there are proper training all the handicaps will be properly overcome. This thought is as naive as the thought of every human error could be eliminated by proper planning. When we execute the voyage plan we have the monitor mechanism to overlook any possible error. While we are using the navigational aid like ARPA/ECDIS we usually do it along where in traditional practice we should use two OOW to do the job. Like the case above, C/O sent the quarter master to standby at his cabin while vessel is sailed in dense fishing vessel traffic China Seas. The golden rule for lookout is looking out the window, now changed to take a second look at the monitor as what to look and what is matter may not very clear to our conscious by ordinary OOW. Any graphic sign into our eye through proper training can catch our attention immediately. But these subconscious reaction are not readily available to us while look down the monitors. The difference of awareness provided by digital is no more than 10 Arabic alphabets which stand for Decimal algorithm. We have to use our conscious to interpretation of the numbers meaning to us.

Unfortunately, we have to say the criteria to be used as the warning signs or starting points for each numerical situation is not identified or specified by the Maritime industrial yet. For example: what is the distance when both crossing vessels have to take the best actions to aid the collision avoidance as required by COLREG steering rules 17

Rule 17 Action by stand-on vessel

(a) (i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.

(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules.

(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.

(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation in accordance with sub-paragraph (a)(ii) of this Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.

(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep out of the way. period.   

The vessel shall keep her course and speed in first stage, may take action to avoid the collision in second stage and shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision in third stage. What are the numerical criteria for these three stages are not specified in COLREG 1972. Is that third stage started from 2 miles away from give-way vessel?  No one knows and no one should say he knows. It is against the COLREG convention intention. It depends on different vessel size and ship type and traffic density and so on and so on. We cannot trust every OOW onboard of each different kinds of service vessel all have sufficient nautical knowledge to all kinds of crossing vessel. This deliberated ambiguous had not created necessary alert but only easier reference for seafarer criminalization or over stressed OOW working reluctantly for monetary purpose on board. Almost 90 percent accident/incident on board is identified as human error/element whether it is deliberated or unintentional. So it should be the obligations of our industrial to think about the possibilities not to torn/worn out these promising future generations to come if we cannot make specific rules applicable to ARPA/ECDIS.

There is the possibility that collision risk is obvious by visual at age of 1972. In the visual age, the feeling of collision is mounting while other vessel approached. In digital age of ARPA, this visual feeling is lost and digital criteria had not set yet. COLREG 1972 needs to be reviewed to cope with new age’s call for those new generations OOW.             

Good habits/Bad habits – Once for all is our human nature,

A successful voyage is a voyage without any incident/accident. All navigational risks are properly appraised, planned, executed and monitored. From paper plan to physical action is the execution stage in our voyage which our conscious can work with 7 ± 2 items only. We have to transfer of the critical points identified in the plan into our memory and shift our attention by the priorities set for execution one by one through proper sequences. But this sequence of execution is only in our imagination as we thought we had followed the good practice identified in the voyage planning. Many of the times we are doing the things in the ways seem most valuable to us, save the efforts and save the time. For the example above, vessel sailed inside Yellow Sea with full speed 26 Knots which can save the transit time and crossing time and overtaking time if any other vessel traffic encountered in this leg of voyage. Pick up an open route by course altered from 117⁰(T) to 090⁰(T) at 1931 hours and check the situation later can save lots efforts in effortless lookout and avoidance action inside the fishing vessels seem prudent to do so in an one-man watched bridge. This time chief Officer forgot another important factor that own ship is crossing reciprocated lane course and he forgot to check whether there is reciprocated north bound vessel approaching.

North bound vessel although had adequate lookout and hands on wheel, the avoidance action are limited by one course alternation from 297.7⁰(T) to 311.5⁰(T) only. No other attempts are taken although the collision risk is enlarged by close range. Once for all, the smartest move seems the most valuable one could simply lead to a catastrophic. Why they don’t want to take second look or second move to eliminate all the uncertainty? Because this is their automatic thought/action to assume this “one smart move” will be enough once for all. This is our working habit which may not seem appropriate to a prudent navigator. Needless to say, this is our human nature. Actually any civilization evolution is based on this lazy bone inside us; no one is exempted for we all have same limited conscious capacity. In another good term, this called the initiative for continuous progress. If the smartest move failed, it called complacency.

Good habits/Bad habits – willingness to comply,

The change of SOP cannot lead by inexperienced personnel even he thinks he is capable.

The shipboard management has to ensure every OOW will follow his discipline by written instructions through standing order and night order. If we are a prudent OOW, the passage execution is smoothly and flawless by our past experiences may not protect us from other threat. Like the collision with reciprocated traffic in last case study is not an possible consequences in Chief Officer mind which lead to improper lookout after course alternation from 117⁰(T) to 090⁰(T) at 1931 hours. If we are neither a prudent nor an experienced OOW in this route we will need extra time to familiar the situations and prepare ourself for the demanding works enroute. This will become a great burden to each OOW especially when all options are opened for choice. The fear and anxiety of the uncertainty could easily crush junior OOW. Master’s standing order and night order provide an easy reference and guidance for junior office is of great value to cultivate their good working habits. Don’t trust any school teaching just by reflecting those days of us in there or thought the time had changed every OOW are more capable than us due to STCW/SOLAS/MLC. The truth is those school days knowledge is vulnerable due to lack of practical experience. When these junior OOW come on board we need to provide our expertise through proper written instructions. They are willingly to comply with all heart.       

The problem comes when they had their own experience and working habits. That’s why almost two third major accidents/incidents are happened in Chief Officer’s duty. The reasons are part of Chief Officer’s complexity works and duties on board and part of their ways of working things out to save their energy and time. The working habits to handle all errands on board may lead them deviated from standard operation procedures from company, Master and Convention. Their willingness to comply is there but their working habits already not desirable any more. Only by the time accident/incident happened, we realize that something is wrong or very wrong. Let’s take a look of another example of misfortune Chief Mate.   

German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty report: 01/08 01 April 2009.

At 04:54 on 2 January 2008, one vessel ran aground on the Varne Bank sandbank in the English Channel. The ship was enroute from Thames Port to Suez Canal.

The Varne bank can be passed on both sides by ships sailing in a southwesterly direction, but ships with larger draught generally circumnavigate the Verne bank to the south, although this is not a recommended deep water route. To the northeast of the Verne bank, there is the “Verne lightship”, which is also clearly visible and identifiable as a racon on the radar. There is further buoy system in place for these 8 NM long shallows in the form of the east E Varne cardinal buoy on the southeast side, in the form of west Mid Varne cardinal buoy on the northwest side and in the form of the south S Verne cardinal buoy on the southwest end. Due to the incorrect interpretation of the radar image, mistaking E Varne and Mid Varne buoys for fisherman, several ships have already run aground on the Varne Bank in the past.

There are some hidden factors in this grounding case other than misinterpretation of the radar pictures.

1. “Chief Officer 58-year-old joined vessel 5 days before the incident at 28 December 2007. The next day 29 December 2007 vessel sailed from Hamburg to Rotterdam and 31 December 2007 vessel sailed from Rotterdam to Thames Port. 01 January 2008 vessel sailed form Thames Port to Port Said. The next day 02 January 2008 in the early morning, vessel grounded.” For a liner vessel in Europe service, those ports inside the North Sea is a nightmare for short ocean passages, endless long channel/inland waterways sailing, terrified crossing traffic inside the English channel in all direction where 10 more vessels interacted within shallows width of one or two Nautical Miles. Seaman describes it very precisely as the Devil Week for those workload in all aspect suffered in this sequences of calling ports. Once outside the English Channel, Biscay Bay known as 360 Miles SW swell rolling is waiting to rock out the smooth sleep while all sailors should deserve to have. Tire, tire and tire are crying out from the muscle and mind from conscious/subconscious and unconscious. Where is the North Sea Pilot supposed to be?
2. “Chief Officer had only the second watch together with his lookout since he joined this vessel. The lookout was not given any instructions of what would be expected of him. No communication between the chief officer and the lookout during the watch prior to the grounding.”

The lookout’s general knowledge of the sea buoy is essential if OOW have to make a briefing to lookout for what would be expected in each duty. In the dense traffic situation of English Channel in that early morning, the attention of both two may divert to fishing lights and crossing traffic. Anyway the west cardinal buoy light character is very distinctive 9 quick flash and 6 very quick plus one long flash for south cardinal buoy. Very quick flashes in any pattern should be reported to OOW immediately by lookout on duty. This is a prudent lookout should do or be trained to do. This automatic report habit of very quick lights flash patterns should be trained as a second nature by each OOW without further instructions to give in any specific watch.

3. “Captain comes to the bridge at 0330 hours and stay till 0420 hours. The watch handover of second mate to chief officer is overseen by Captain. The ship was on a course line of 223⁰(T) and according to the voyage planning of the 3^rd officer the route was set south of the Varne Bank. The chief officer stated that he had generally sailed north past the Verne Bank on other ship’s in the past, but that he is fully aware of the southern route.”    

The chief office only have the knowledge that this course line is set on south of Verne Bank, but no situation awareness is aroused by this change while he examine the chart. In another word at 0400 hours, there is no danger feeling established in his conscious that course alternation to starboard side might involve grounding danger. Since no danger feeling aroused, chief officer old habit remained “starboard side is safe”.

4. “At 0428 hours, the lookout reported a light from the Verne lightship and an object crossing into the fairway from the port side. At 0436 hours, change of course from 225⁰(T) to 237⁰(T). The chief officer plans an evasion maneuver toward starboard; this evasion course leads precisely between the east and west cardinal buoy of the Verne Bank; the buoys were interpreted as moving fishing vessels.”   

This course alternation from 225⁰(T) to 237⁰(T) at 0436 hours is based on the ECS Electric Chart System image as below. The shallow water area is as blue as other areas with 24 meters depth. These colors are allocated in accordance with the IHO Standard S-52, it surely is a shortcoming in the symbolic presentation of ECS which give no visual stimulation to human eyes thus no situational awareness could be expected. However this shortcoming in design level finally bear the bad fruits in an misfortune and tired chief officer.

5. “However, with the brightness configuration “NIGHT” selected at the time of accident the buoy symbols are almost not visible and the display of the depth contours is low in contrast to such an extent that no differentiation can be identified between the shallower or deeper areas of the Shallow Contour.”

Although the color pattern and design philosophy of ECS is different from paper charts any more, chief officer still believe what we sought is what we got. Stick in his old habit and believe that the chart whether electrical or paper back will give us all information we need. Like a Old Captain said “ What is ECDIS training ? why we need 5 days session?”. There is no respect to the machine ECDIS suppose to help in our decision and easy the working load. Instead new equipment always brings in new limitations which we have to respect like this case. If we want just do it in our old fashion (habits), we will suffer by these neglects.    

The willingness to change ourself/our working habit to adopt new technology and equipment is a great burden to modern life. Millions people waiting for new generation iPhone may not all satisfied with their old iPhone. Most of them are change blind due to it disturb our LT memory. We need smooth transition in any aspect. This laziness is human nature due to our limited conscious capacity to handle all the changes. The willingness to comply new rules/regulations depends on our mental and physical ability after properly rested/recovered from exhausting works. Like this case, the official report concluded as followed:

“Estuary and coastal trading is a huge load for the crew, in particular for the chief officer, who is traditionally responsible for load and stability. A sleep deficit due to loading and unloading operations and other disruptions is almost inevitably a given when it comes to such voyage. The term rest time is often defined in different ways. If the officers, for example, during their leisure time, particularly during the stay in port, spend time in the mess or quarters, they are still bothered with questions, calls, visitors or appraisers during the break period. Such “work” may amount to several hours a day during the stay in port, but is often perceived and documented very differently by those affected. This is compounded by the fact that, irrespective of the recorded overtime, the crew receives flat-rate pay, which inevitably means that the care does not tend to be taken when it comes to completing work time sheets”.       

The tiredness also reduces our situational awareness by unconscious letting go important facts and let the old habits slip into our decision pattern in our subconscious. At the same time, the emotional feeling and the rational logics are all deteriorated without conscious awareness. It happened so nature so even things goes very wrong we still cannot comprehensive what is really happened. It took another 15 minutes at 0500 hours that Chief office and Captain really understand what is actually happened on board. This is another indication of the shortcoming of this type of Electrical Chart System in use where no visible indication of the grounding danger vessel may face. The grounding is make sure by radar fix afterward.  

These are the situations on board after the grounding.

End of Chapter 8 and PART I of Individual

Reflections of part I.

All personal errors can be summarized as poor LT memory or bad working habits. One thing emerges from our subconscious or our working memory without any effort that is our working habits. We all have some habits more or less in our daily works. To refine the working habits have to work with positive memory enforcement.

Also the study of our decision qualities are serious affected by the pressure we felt. More pressure tends to make us lost the ability to identify the key elements in our normal job function. The reliability of our memory depends on our skill level as discussion before. For everyone, there is a simple fact “once any pressure felt, the ability of people to deal with complex issues will gradually decrease and when the pressure reaches a certain limit, people's ability to handle the issue will come to an intolerable low stage”. We need 10 years to cultivate an expert with proper LT memory storage and good working habits to support his wearing body and mind is due to our limited conscious space which always finding the most easiest and quickest way to do the job. There is no way out. It is human nature to make the mistake follow our subconscious habits and unconscious feeling even not aware of by our own conscious.

Most of the time, our feeling is correct about the thing gonna happen. But we lost the feeling/situation awareness when we are tired. Everything seems fine when we are tired. In these days seaman feel tired due to physical dedication to the job required (seaman never find any excuse for their absent, they all know we need other hand’s help from time to time and willing to help each other although their own workload seems never easier)  and mental isolation/confusion due to multinational seaman/culture working together. These factors cannot be coped by the individual power only. It’s need shore base carefully management techniques and long time culture cultivation process to work all seafarers on board as comfortable as working at their home town with their people.      

To avoid one man error due to human nature we need to work out a small group on board to cope with the challenge we are facing everyday or the mistake slip out from our working habits/subconscious. In this Aquarian Century, the groups we need to support our daily work are no longer united by the discipline or management only anymore. It consists of more comfort feeling inside the job we are accomplished each day. Yes. It is emotional century we are living now.  

End of reflections.

End of chapter 8